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INTRODUCTION 
People trust their doctors. Indeed, polls indicate that 
doctors—along with nurses—consistently rank among the most 
trusted professionals in the United States based on their 
reputation for honesty and ethical conduct.1 This high level of 
trust is critical to effective health care delivery.2 Why, then, 
 
 Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Helen 
Norton and the editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for inviting me 
to participate in the Ira C. Rothgerber Symposium. 
 1. Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/ 
honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/ 
DB92-2GBD]. Every year since 1990, Gallup has conducted a poll of Americans’ 
views regarding the honesty and ethics of various professions. The three highest-
ranked professions in 2016 were nurses, pharmacists, and doctors (in that order). 
Id. This finding is relatively consistent with findings in prior years. See Rebecca 
Rifkin, Americans Rate Nurses Highest on Honesty, Ethical Standards, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/180260/americans-rate-nurses-highest-honesty-
ethical-standards.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SG53-CTC3]. 
Lawyers, sadly, rank rather low, but significantly above members of Congress. 
Honesty/Ethics in Professions, supra (finding only 18 percent of Americans rank 
lawyers “very high” or “high” in honesty and ethics, compared with 8 percent for 
members of Congress). 
 2. See, e.g., Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of 
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would the government ever require doctors to provide false or 
misleading medical information to their patients? And what 
would be the impact of such a requirement? Those are the 
questions at the heart of this Article. 
State-mandated falsehoods are rampant in the context of 
abortion regulation. State legislatures have required doctors, 
before performing abortions, to provide scientifically 
unsupported information to women, such as that having an 
abortion increases the risk of breast cancer or that it has 
negative mental health effects.3 Given the lack of evidence to 
sustain these sorts of claims, it seems reasonable to refer to 
such statements as government-mandated lies.4 However, 
these lies are different in many respects from the sorts of lies 
that have been studied in the growing literature on the legal 
regulation of lies, both private and governmental.5 The goal of 
this Article is to consider the unique problems raised by the 
misleading statements that the government mandates in the 
abortion context and to suggest a doctrinal framework for 
analyzing the constitutionality of such lies. 
This Article argues that government-mandated lies in the 
abortion context are unique in several ways that make them 
unlikely to be found unconstitutional despite the fact that they 
obviously hinder patients’ interest in access to information and 
to a constitutionally protected procedure. First, it is often 
difficult to categorize the kind of speech in which the lie occurs; 
 
Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1708, 1708, 1713 
(1998). 
 3. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii) (2017). As another 
example, Arizona passed a law in 2015 requiring women to be informed that a 
nonsurgical abortion is reversible after it has begun. 2015 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 
87. This law was repealed after the state failed to produce any credible evidence to 
support the law’s claim. See 2016 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 267 (repealing 2015 
ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 87). 
 4. See, e.g., Andrew Beck, Why Is Arizona Forcing Doctors to Lie to Women 
Who Need Abortions?, ACLU (June 4, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-
freely/why-arizona-forcing-doctors-lie-women-who-need-abortions 
[https://perma.cc/PX9Y-N5KP]. 
 5. See, e.g., SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS 3 (2014) 
(predominately discussing legal regulation of private lies); Helen Norton, The 
Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 99–107 (2015) 
[hereinafter Norton, The Government’s Lies] (exploring government lies that 
threaten personal liberties protected by the First Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161 
(arguing that the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of some but 
not all types of private lies). 
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this difficulty hinders the First Amendment analysis. Second, 
although it is rhetorically effective to call these misleading 
statements “lies,” it is in fact somewhat difficult to say whether 
that label properly applies.6 Finally, the sorts of harms 
imposed by the government’s lies in this context are in many 
respects distinct from those created by governmental lies in 
other contexts. The uniqueness of the harm makes these lies a 
poor fit with existing doctrinal tests. Ultimately, this article 
concludes that the primary harm caused by governmental 
falsehoods in the abortion context is a form of expressive 
injury. Analogizing to the harm caused by violations of the 
Establishment Clause or by racist speech, I argue that under 
the revised framework established by the Supreme Court in the 
2016 case Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,7 such 
expressive harms can and should be recognized as imposing an 
unconstitutional undue burden on the abortion right. 
Part I of this Article gives an overview of the kinds of lies 
that state governments promulgate in the abortion context.  
These lies include falsehoods that come in the form of 
government-sponsored speech as well as in the form of untrue 
or misleading statements that health care providers are legally 
required to share with patients. Part I also considers a 
different kind of governmental lie, which is represented by 
laws that impose a false narrative on women about the 
meaning of abortion and pregnancy. Next, Part II considers 
some of the ways in which such lies are unique, as compared to 
the sorts of government lies considered by other scholars. Part 
II argues that false or misleading government-mandated 
disclosures in the abortion context are difficult to categorize for 
purposes of First Amendment doctrine. In fact, it may even be 
difficult to call them outright lies, unlike—for example—
government officials’ falsehoods about military activities or 
knowing lies told by a prosecutor to secure a criminal 
conviction.8 In addition, Part II proposes that the 
predominantly expressive nature of the harm caused by 
government lies in the abortion context is a unique feature of 
 
 6. As I discuss further in Section II.B, the definition of a “lie” is debatable, 
and indeed has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., 
SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 12–15 & nn.16–25 (discussing the author’s definition of 
lying and contrasting it with other philosophers’ definitions). 
 7. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 8. See Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 73–74, 79 & n.28. 
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those lies. Finally, Part III considers how misleading disclosure 
requirements in the abortion context should be analyzed under 
the Constitution, proposing that even if such requirements are 
constitutional under the First Amendment, they raise 
significant problems under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I. THE LIES STATES TELL 
This Part discusses the various kinds of misleading 
statements that are required by state law abortion restrictions 
and briefly explains the doctrinal framework that applies to 
each. States have generally introduced falsehoods into the 
abortion context through informed consent requirements. 
These laws statutorily mandate that specific information be 
given in order to meet the requirements of informed consent 
that apply to all medical and surgical procedures. For example, 
state laws often provide that consent will not be considered 
informed—and therefore civil or criminal liability may attach—
if particular information is not provided.9 
Sometimes, this information must be provided in 
government-created literature—in other words, through 
government speech.10 Section I.A describes the laws that 
mandate these sorts of lies, here called “direct government 
lies.” Other statutes require abortion providers themselves to 
give particular information. As discussed in Section I.B, these 
requirements—which I call “compelled private lies”—
commandeer private speakers for the government’s message 
and may pose greater First Amendment problems than those 
that come directly from the government.11 For both types of 
informed-consent requirements, however, state laws often 
provide a sort of escape hatch by which physicians may 
distance themselves from the message by giving further 
context or explaining that they disagree with the statement 
that they are required by law to provide.12 
 
 9. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(B), (G) (2017) (subjecting a 
physician to civil liability for failure to provide a woman with certain information 
twenty-four hours before performing an abortion); id. § 2919.192 (imposing 
criminal penalties for failure to inform a woman of the existence of a fetal 
heartbeat). 
 10. See infra Section I.A. 
 11. See infra Section I.B. 
 12. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 n.8 (8th 
Cir. 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.013(c) (2017); cf. Rumsfeld v. 
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Also considered in this Part is a different form of falsehood. 
Specifically, Section I.C discusses regulations that are aimed at 
creating a particular narrative about pregnancy that is false 
and misleading in that it takes one possible perspective among 
many and treats it as the one true perspective. This category of 
“false narratives” includes requirements that physicians 
provide an ultrasound to women seeking abortions, 
accompanied by a requirement that the woman must view the 
ultrasound or listen to a narrated description of the 
ultrasound.13 It also includes the recent wave of laws that 
require burial or cremation of fetal remains.14 This Section 
explains that these laws are aimed at imposing a particular 
understanding of pregnancy on the woman—one that generally 
conflicts with the woman’s understanding. They are considered 
together with more typical, obviously misleading statements 
because, as discussed in Section II.C, they impose similar types 
of harms. 
A. Direct Government Lies 
In this Article, I use the term “direct government lies” to 
refer to falsehoods or misleading statements that are 
articulated by the government and provided to the patient in 
the form of direct government speech. For example, some states 
require certain abortion-related information be given in state-
created brochures or materials, which are then provided to the 
woman by the abortion clinic. Although the abortion provider 
plays a role in conveying this information to the patient, it is 
obvious with respect to such government-produced materials 
that the source of the speech is the state. 
Some such state-produced materials contain false or 
misleading scientific information. For instance, Texas law 
requires physicians to provide certain printed materials to 
 
Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69–70 (2006) (rejecting 
a claim that a requirement to allow military recruiters on campus violated 
students’ and faculty members’ freedom of association, in part because those 
individuals remained free to associate “to voice their disapproval of the military’s 
message”). 
 13. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017), held unconstitutional by 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 14. E.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132-1.136 (2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-
3-4(a) (2017). 
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women seeking abortions.15 Those materials describe the risks 
of abortion in ways that are lacking in context and likely to 
confuse the reader.16 To take one example, the brochure 
published by the Texas Department of Health and Human 
Services, called A Woman’s Right to Know, references an 
increased risk of future infertility from abortion without 
explaining the extremely small likelihood of such an outcome.17 
In fact, the overall risk of serious complications is very low, and 
future infertility is not even a risk that is specifically 
recognized by the medical literature.18 Thus, though the 
brochure’s statement is not false in a strict sense, it is 
presented in a highly misleading manner and likely to be 
misconstrued by a reader who is not well versed in the 
scientific literature. 
Another example of state-sanctioned misinformation 
involves the purported link between abortion and breast 
cancer. The same Texas brochure contains the following 
paragraph regarding breast cancer as a risk of induced 
abortion: 
Your pregnancy history affects your chances of getting 
breast cancer. If you give birth to your baby, you are less 
likely to develop breast cancer in the future. Research 
indicates that having an abortion will not provide you this 
increased protection against breast cancer. In addition, 
doctors and scientists are actively studying the complex 
biology of breast cancer to understand whether abortion 
may affect the risk of breast cancer. If you have a family 
 
 15. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.013(a) (2017). 
 16. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 9 
(2016). 
 17. Id. Although the statements in the brochure that infertility is a risk of 
abortion and that “[t]he further along you are in your pregnancy, the greater the 
chance of serious complications that can cause you to be infertile” are technically 
true, they may suggest to someone unversed in the medical literature that the 
risks associated with abortion are substantial. Id. 
 18. Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Incidence of Emergency Department Visits and 
Complications After Abortion, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 175, 175 (2015) 
(finding, based on a study of California Medicaid patients, that the overall 
complication rate for abortion is 2.1 percent and that the rate of major 
complications, such as the kind that can lead to infertility, is only 0.23 percent); 
see also Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect of Pregnancy 
Termination on Future Reproduction, 4 BAILLIÈRE’S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY 391 (1990) (finding no significant risk of reproductive problems 
following abortion). 
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history of breast cancer or breast disease, ask your doctor 
how your pregnancy will affect your risk of breast cancer.19 
This paragraph implies that there is a medical link 
between choosing abortion and an elevated risk of breast 
cancer or, at the very least, it suggests that the jury is still out 
on this question. However, the National Cancer Institute—
which is a division of the National Institutes of Health and “the 
federal government’s principal agency for cancer research”20—
has found that “[i]nduced abortion is not associated with an 
increase in breast cancer risk.”21 Moreover, it has indicated 
that that finding is supported by the strongest scientific 
evidence.22 
In a similar vein, the Alaska Department of Health and 
Social Services, in its online materials, presents information on 
the purported abortion-breast cancer link in a highly 
misleading manner. First, it provides the view of the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) disputing 
any link between abortion and breast cancer.23 ACOG is the 
principal membership organization for physicians in that 
specialty area.24 Directly after this, it describes the view of the 
 
 19. TEX. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16, at 9. 
 20. National Cancer Institute Overview and Mission, NAT’L CANCER INST.,  
https://www.cancer.gov/about-nci/overview (last visited July 11, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/J4VE-TXV7]. 
 21. Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk: 2003 Workshop, NAT’L 
CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/types/breast/abortion-miscarriage-risk (last 
visited June 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K5ZX-G8GF]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., MAKING A DECISION ABOUT 
YOUR PREGNANCY, (2010), http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/wcfh/documents/informed 
consent/assets/abortion.pdf  [https://perma.cc/K78B-HUPA]. Alaska law gives the 
physician the option of either providing this internet information to the woman or 
informing her of “the nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the 
proposed procedure that a reasonable patient would consider material to making 
a voluntary and informed decision of whether to undergo the procedure.” ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 18.16.060(b) (2017). Given the official statements quoted above on 
the subject of breast cancer risk, it is probably not entirely clear, as a matter of 
Alaska law, whether a “reasonable patient” would consider that information 
“material” to her abortion decision. It is therefore logical to assume that a prudent 
physician would simply opt to provide the state-sponsored message to the patient 
in order to avoid the risk of liability. 
 24. About Us, AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG), 
https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/About-Us (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/T7E8-7MKL]. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists is associated with, but distinct from, the American Congress of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which is dedicated to advocacy on behalf of 
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American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (AAPLOG)—an advocacy organization dedicated 
to “encourag[ing] and equip[ping] its members and other 
concerned medical practitioners to provide an evidence-based 
rationale for defending the lives of both the pregnant mother 
and her unborn child.”25 Unsurprisingly, the AAPLOG quote 
asserts that such a link exists.26 This juxtaposition of the two 
sources, without further commentary, appears to put the two 
sources on equal footing, although one source is an objective 
medical source and the other comes from a political advocacy 
organization. The Texas and Alaska materials do not provide 
any actual statistics or reference the National Cancer 
Institute’s finding, which might allow the reader to put these 
two opposing viewpoints into context. 
Despite their obviously misleading nature, such 
statements are unlikely to raise First Amendment concerns 
because they involve government speech.27 The government is 
generally unconstrained by the First Amendment when it 
expresses its own message.28 It need not observe the standards 
of content or viewpoint neutrality.29 In addition, there is little 
danger that the patient will mistake the state-sponsored 
brochure for the physician’s own message, and the physician is 
entitled in any case to provide additional context for the 
information in the state’s materials.30 There is, therefore, no 
concern about the speech being misattributed to a private 
 
ob/gyns. The two organizations share a website. 
 25. Our Mission Statement, AAPLOG, http://aaplog.org/about-us/our-mission-
statement/  (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7VCC-XV8R]. 
 26. ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., supra note 23 (“The American 
Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG) supports the 
view that there is a causal relationship between breast cancer and the 
termination of pregnancy.”). 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. Steven G. Gey, Why Should the First Amendment Protect Government 
Speech When the Government Has Nothing to Say?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1262 
(2010) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009)) 
(noting that the First Amendment does not constrain government speech). Helen 
Norton has argued, however, that governmental lies ought to be understood to 
violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment in some circumstances. 
Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 99–107. 
 29. Summum, 555 U.S. at 479–80. 
 30. Cf. Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 844 (2010) 
(arguing that constitutional problems may arise when government speech can be 
mistakenly attributed to individuals, but that the ability to distance oneself from 
the government speech may be relevant). 
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speaker and no damage to the speaker’s own interests. As 
explained at greater length in Part III, however, such 
requirements may violate the Due Process Clause by imposing 
an undue burden on abortion rights. 
B. Compelled Private Lies 
Even more troubling than misleading statements in 
government publications are compelled private lies. These are 
government-mandated falsehoods that physicians are required 
to provide directly to women seeking abortions within the 
context of a doctor-patient counseling session. I refer to these 
statements as “compelled private lies” because they are 
misleading or false statements that the government forces 
private speakers to pronounce. For example, South Dakota 
requires doctors to inform women that abortion carries an 
“[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”31 According to 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals—which considered a 
challenge to this requirement—some studies had in fact 
indicated that the risk of suicide was greater among women 
who had had abortions than among women who had not, but 
there was no evidence to support the notion that the greater 
risk was caused by the abortion (as opposed to being caused by 
the unplanned pregnancy itself or other mental health issues 
that may correlate with unplanned pregnancy).32 The Eighth 
Circuit nonetheless upheld the provision, explaining that it 
was true that women who have had abortions have a greater 
relative risk of suicide than women who have not, regardless of 
the cause, and that relative risk is often synonymous with 
increased risk.33 There was, therefore, a possible reading 
according to which the required disclosure was true and, for 
this reason, the appeals court vacated the lower court’s order 
enjoining the law.34 
From a free speech perspective, requirements that turn 
abortion providers into mouthpieces for the state are 
 
 31. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(ii)(2017)). 
 32. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 900–02; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion 
Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1182–85 (2014) (explaining, based on 
scientific studies, that “abortion does not in fact undermine women’s mental 
health”). 
 33. Rounds, 686 F.3d at 895. 
 34. Id. at 905–06. 
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considerably more problematic than government speech. 
Because they compel private speech, the First Amendment 
applies.35 There is a risk, of course, of misattribution—that is, 
that the woman will think that the speech reflects the doctor’s 
views rather than those of the state.36 In addition, some such 
speech requirements are almost blatantly ideological. The 
commandeering of an individual’s body and mind to require a 
political or ideological utterance with which the individual 
disagrees usually violates the right to freedom of expression.37 
The caselaw on compelled speech divides the speech to be 
compelled into different categories, which correspond to 
different levels of scrutiny. Compelled speech is generally 
subject to strict scrutiny when it is ideological in nature.38 
Thus, in Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood v. 
Templeton, the district court found that Planned Parenthood 
was likely to succeed in its challenge to a Kansas law requiring 
the clinic to include a hyperlink to a government internet site 
containing inaccurate and biased information about abortion.39 
For example, the government site asserted that pregnancy 
begins with fertilization, whereas the medical consensus is that 
pregnancy begins with implantation; it understated the 
number of pregnancies that end naturally in miscarriage; and 
it stated that “[a]bortion terminates the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”40 Under the statute, 
Planned Parenthood was required to refer to this information 
as being “objective, nonjudgmental, [and] scientifically 
accurate.”41 Ultimately, the court did not clearly hold that this 
requirement violated Planned Parenthood’s free speech rights 
 
 35. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”). 
 36. Abner S. Greene, The Concept of the Speech Platform: Walker v. Texas 
Division, 68 ALA. L. REV. 337, 370 (2016) (“The right against compelled speech is 
best understood as a right not to foster a message one does not wish to foster, but 
sometimes the Court focuses on the concern with being improperly tagged with a 
message with which one does not want to be associated.”). 
 37. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631–34 (1943); 
Greene, supra note 36, at 370. 
 38. Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 at 713; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
939, 957 (2007). 
 39. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v. 
Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1219 (D. Kan. 2013). 
 40. Id. at 1219 n.16. 
 41. Id. at 1212. 
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but instead, after declaring the case to be a close one, stated 
that the provision “appears overbroad,” at least with respect to 
non-patients who may view Planned Parenthood’s website.42 
When the speech is considered either commercial or 
professional in nature, the level of scrutiny applied is lower.43 
Although the free-speech doctrine pertaining to professional 
speech is relatively undeveloped,44 it is clear that the state is 
permitted to mandate a wider range of factual disclosures in 
the context of the doctor-patient relationship—particularly in 
the form of informed consent requirements—than in other 
private speech contexts.45 The regulation of private speech in 
the form of informed consent law may be considered an aspect 
of the regulation of the medical profession itself.46 As such, 
constitutional doctrine in this context is concerned primarily 
with the protection of the patient rather than with the 
expressive interests of the speaker.47 
 
 42. Id. at 1221. It appears that the case settled before trial. Order 
Administratively Closing Case, Dkt. 56, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 13-CV-02302 
(administratively closing the case and ordering the parties to submit a stipulation 
of dismissal). 
 43. Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 n.17; Post, supra note 38, at 949 
(“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be censored and 
suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical 
establishment. But when a physician speaks to a patient in the course of medical 
treatment, his opinions are normally regulated on the theory that they are 
inseparable from the practice of medicine.”); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial 
Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 
147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 786–88 (1999); see also Claudia E. Haupt, Professional 
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1246–68 (2016) (defining professional speech and 
distinguishing it from other kinds of speech). 
 44. For example, the Third Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in a case 
involving a state law ban on licensed counselors engaging in a form of therapy 
known as sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE). King v. Governor of N.J., 767 
F.3d 216, 233 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[P]rohibitions of professional speech are 
constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s interest in protecting its 
citizens from harmful or ineffective professional practices and are no more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”). In so doing, it followed the lead 
of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. Id. at 232 (citing Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 
760 F.3d 1195, 1217–26 (11th Cir. 2014); Moore–King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 
Va., 708 F.3d 560, 568–70 (4th Cir. 2013)). However, other courts have suggested 
that professional speech restrictions should receive more deferential review (e.g., 
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014)), or that compelled speech in 
a professional or commercial context requires only rational-basis scrutiny (see, 
e.g., Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 45. Haupt, supra note 43, at 1258; B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis 
Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60 (2015). 
 46. Hill, supra note 45, at 60. 
 47. Id. at 62. 
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One of the most important cases dealing with professional 
speech arose in the abortion context. In the seminal case 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court considered a 
claim that Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirements for 
abortion violated the physician’s First Amendment rights by 
requiring her to provide specific state-mandated information to 
the patient.48 The state-mandated information included “the 
nature of the procedure, the health risks of abortion and of 
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn 
child,’” as well as “the availability of printed materials 
published by the State describing the fetus and providing 
information about medical assistance for childbirth, 
information about child support from the father, and a list of 
agencies which provide adoption and other services as 
alternatives to abortion.”49 Of course, none of these statements 
was false or even misleading. 
In a very brief passage, the Court rejected the free-speech 
claim out of hand: 
To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to 
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of 
medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by 
the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the 
requirement that the physician provide the information 
mandated by the State here.50 
The Court’s language of reasonableness, along with its 
dismissive treatment of the claim, suggest something like 
rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech 
claim. 
The Court also considered whether the informed consent 
requirements imposed an undue burden on abortion rights, 
applying the standard that the Casey plurality had just 
adopted for analyzing abortion restrictions.51 After a somewhat 
lengthier analysis, the Court also held that relevant, truthful, 
and nonmisleading informed consent requirements did not 
 
 48. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 49. Id. at 881. 
 50. Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 603 (1977)). 
 51. Id. at 874. 
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constitute an undue burden.52 Concluding that the state had a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that the woman’s choice was 
well-informed and that both psychological risks of abortion and 
“impact on the fetus” were relevant to her decision, the Court 
upheld the Pennsylvania requirements.53 
As an added twist, some courts simply decline to apply 
First Amendment doctrine at all to compelled-speech 
challenges arising in the abortion context.54 For example, the 
same South Dakota law requiring that women be informed of 
their increased suicide risk also required doctors to tell them 
that they were about to “terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being.”55 Rather than consider whether 
such a compelled ideological statement met the First 
Amendment standard of strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit 
simply merged the First Amendment analysis with the “undue 
burden” standard laid out in Casey for identifying violations of 
the Due Process right to abortion.56 The court explained: 
[T]he [Supreme] Court found no violation of the physician’s 
right not to speak, without need for further analysis of 
whether the requirements were narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest, . . . where physicians merely were 
required to give ‘truthful, nonmisleading information’ 
relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.57 
Thus, compelled private lies fall in a sort of no-man’s-land of 
First Amendment doctrine, in which it is unclear which free-
speech analysis applies—if any applies at all. 
 
 52. Id. at 882. 
 53. Id. at 881–84. 
 54. See Corbin, supra note 32, at 1191–92; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion 
Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047, 
1068–83 (2014). 
 55. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 56. Id. at 734; see also Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (merging the undue burden and First 
Amendment analyses, and finding that informed consent requirements “do not fall 
under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment 
strict scrutiny”). 
 57. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734. 
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C. False Narratives 
A recent wave of legislation imposes requirements on 
abortion providers that seem, at first glance, to have little or 
nothing to do with speech. However, these laws have an 
expressive function, and this expressive function is, in fact, one 
of the laws’ most important features.58 For example, both Texas 
and Indiana have recently passed laws requiring that fetal 
tissue be buried or cremated, as if it were a human corpse 
rather than tissue removed during a medical procedure.59 As 
another example, in 2011, North Carolina passed a law 
requiring every patient to receive an ultrasound before an 
abortion.60 In the course of the ultrasound, the provider was 
required to give the following narration: 
a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting, 
which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions 
of the unborn child within the uterus and the number of 
unborn children depicted. The individual performing the 
display shall offer the pregnant woman the opportunity to 
hear the fetal heart tone. . . . [d]isplay the images so that 
the pregnant woman may view them[, and] [p]rovide a 
medical description of the images, which shall include the 
dimensions of the embryo or fetus and the presence of 
external members and internal organs, if present and 
viewable.61 
If she wished, the woman could cover her ears and avert her 
eyes, but the provider would still be required to give the above-
described narration.62 In other words, the state was requiring 
the provider to delineate the human features of the fetus, 
whether or not the woman wanted to hear about them. Thus, 
the North Carolina law forced the provider to parrot the state’s 
narrative of fetal personhood and to do so regardless of any 
possible impact of the narrative on the patient herself. The 
 
 58. For a general overview of expressivism in law, see Elizabeth S. Anderson 
& Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000). 
 59. E.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.132-1.136; IND. CODE § 16-34-3-4(a). 
 60. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at § 90-21.85(b); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 252–53 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
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narrative might have been psychologically traumatizing in 
some circumstances, or it might have had no impact at all if a 
particular woman chose to plug her ears and look away. False-
narrative laws may therefore be understood as a form of 
symbolic government speech (and as such are related to the 
category of direct government lies discussed above). They 
convey a message to patients and to the public at large through 
requiring particular conduct, rather than through speech. 
States justify these false-narrative laws on various 
grounds. North Carolina claimed that its ultrasound 
requirement was a measure to ensure that the woman’s 
consent was fully informed.63 Indiana asserted that its law 
regarding burial or cremation of fetal remains served to protect 
the dignity of fetal life.64 However, these laws clearly impose on 
the woman, and perhaps on the public, a particular conception 
of the fetus and pregnancy.65 They encourage, and are likely 
intended to encourage, or even force, women to think of fetuses 
in utero as babies and to put themselves in a mothering role 
with respect to that fetus.66 They force both the woman and the 
abortion provider to go through the motions of prenatal care (in 
the case of ultrasound laws) or of stillbirth (in the case of 
burial/cremation laws), thus coercing the woman to 
contemplate a very different setting from that of intentional 
pregnancy termination. Of course, many women who choose to 
abort either do not view or wish to view the fetus in the same 
way that they would view a wanted pregnancy.67 
Moreover, these laws, by their very enactment (often 
accompanied by a great deal of publicity), send the same 
 
 63. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 251. 
 64. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 
870–71 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (describing the state’s asserted interests). 
 65. Fetal tissue disposal laws may also be intended to impose heavy financial 
burdens on abortion clinics that may, in some cases, force them to close, or they 
may be intended to give funeral homes and crematoria the power to prevent 
abortion clinics from operating by refusing to accept fetal remains. See, e.g., Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 230–32 (W.D. Tex. 2017). 
 66. Cf. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the 
Problem for Law, 100 CAL. L. REV. 269, 307 (2012) (discussing laws allowing the 
issuance of birth certificates for stillborns and “the implicit relationship between 
acknowledging birth and establishing fetal personhood”); Carol Sanger, Seeing 
and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 351, 401 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and Believing] (“The 
image is being offered to prove that this fetus is your child. It is something in the 
order of a dare.”). 
 67. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 66, at 401. 
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messages to the public at large, thus increasing the stigma 
surrounding the abortion procedure and perhaps magnifying 
any guilt or shame the woman might feel about her decision. It 
is not uncommon for the legislation to contain colorful and 
politically charged language, such as referring to the fetus as 
an “unborn child.”68 Such language furthers the narrative that 
the pregnant woman is already a mother, and that her 
pregnancy termination is murder. This kind of legislation, by 
telegraphing a denigrating message about abortion and by 
forcing the provider and the woman to participate in enacting a 
narrative of motherhood and fetal personhood that the state 
has imposed upon them, stigmatizes both patients and 
providers. 
Although such laws have expressive content, they 
implicate “speech,” if at all, only indirectly. Therefore, they are 
usually not found to violate the First Amendment.69 Instead, a 
few of these laws have been challenged under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. For example, the Indiana law regulating disposal 
of fetal tissue was found to run afoul of substantive due process 
because it lacked any legitimate purpose.70 This holding 
applied the fundamental principle that all laws must have a 
legitimate purpose, which is not a requirement that is specific 
to abortion restrictions.71 Faced with a similar law from Texas, 
the Fifth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction on grounds of 
vagueness and undue burden, finding that the difficulty of 
complying with the law substantially outweighed the claimed 
benefit of respecting fetal dignity.72 In contrast, in considering 
an ultrasound requirement, the Fifth Circuit merged the First 
 
 68. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.85 (2017); ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4 
(2017). Fetal tissue legislation recently proposed (but not enacted) in Ohio used 
the derogatory term “abortionist” to refer to physicians who perform abortions. 
H.R. 149, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017). 
 69. Ultrasound and, especially, required ultrasound narration are forms of 
speech and have been analyzed under the First Amendment. Indeed, in Stuart v. 
Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a claim that an 
ultrasound requirement violated the First Amendment. 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th 
Cir. 2014). However, I argue here that the constitutional problems with false-
narrative laws do not arise from the content of the ultrasound or the speech 
accompanying it, which is factual; instead, they arise from the expressive content 
of the required conduct. 
 70. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 265 F. Supp. 3d 859, 
870 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232 (W.D. 
Tex. 2017). 
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Amendment and “undue burden” analyses and found that, 
because the information provided by the ultrasound was 
relevant, truthful, and nonmisleading, the law was 
constitutional.73 None of these cases, however, explicitly 
considered the expressive harm wrought by the restrictions. 
II. HOW THE PROBLEM OF LIES IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT IS 
UNIQUE 
The abortion context is legally unique in many respects. 
This Part focuses on the particular ways in which state-
compelled, misleading abortion-related disclosures pose special 
problems for constitutional law. In particular, such 
requirements are resistant to challenge under the First 
Amendment. Direct government lies, as explained above, 
generally constitute government speech and are therefore 
immune to First Amendment challenges. Section II.A further 
explains that compelled private lies, which are a form of 
compelled speech, could be subject to free-speech challenges in 
theory, but they are often difficult to categorize for First 
Amendment purposes. As a result, some courts engage in a 
highly deferential analysis of those falsehoods. Second, as 
Section II.B discusses, the falsehoods contained in both direct 
government lies and compelled private lies may be difficult to 
identify, as they are often a product of the particular way in 
which factual information is presented. Third, Section II.C 
suggests that the primary harm resulting from lies in the 
abortion disclosure context—whether direct government lies, 
compelled private lies, or false narratives—differs from the sort 
of harm usually associated in the legal literature with 
government falsehoods in that it is primarily expressive in 
nature. The unusual nature of this harm makes these lies 
difficult to challenge under the First Amendment, as well as 
under the Fourteenth Amendment undue-burden standard, as 
it has been understood in the years leading up to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt. 
 
 73. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 
580 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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A. Categorizing the Speech 
As explained above, under the First Amendment different 
degrees of scrutiny apply to compelled speech mandates, 
depending on the nature of the speech being compelled.74 
Although some uncertainty remains about the appropriate 
treatment of compelled professional speech, it is generally 
subjected to rational-basis review so long as the regulation is 
part and parcel of the regulation of the underlying profession 
itself.75 Thus, informed consent requirements must actually be 
pertinent to the medical treatment and further the goals of 
that treatment.76 If they simply further unrelated goals or 
contain irrelevant information, they would be scrutinized more 
strictly. For example, requiring physicians to inform patients of 
the medical risks of a particular surgery would be within the 
scope of medical treatment, but requiring them to endorse a 
particular political candidate would not.77 Thus, compelled 
statements that are categorized as ideological speech will be 
subjected to strict scrutiny, whereas compelled statements that 
are categorized as professional speech and within the scope of 
medical relevance will be subjected to a lower level of scrutiny. 
When compelled private lies are challenged under the First 
Amendment, however, courts have a particularly difficult time 
categorizing them.78 Though many courts implicitly identify 
them as professional speech, thus subjecting them to minimal 
First Amendment scrutiny, some courts recognize that the 
speech being compelled is in some instances ideological in 
nature and therefore must be subject to stricter scrutiny.79 As I 
 
 74. See supra Section I.B. 
 75. Id. But see supra note 44 (explaining that some courts apply intermediate 
scrutiny when professional speech is affected). 
 76. Post, supra note 38, at 952. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Similarly, courts have difficulty categorizing misleading or false speech by 
crisis pregnancy centers, which also pertains to abortion. Hill, supra note 45, at 
69 (citing Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 
2014), Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2013), 
and O’Brien v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 814 (D. 
Md. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. 
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 683 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc, 
721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub 
nom. Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City 
Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013)). 
 79. Compare Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 
2008), and Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 
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have argued elsewhere, this confusion may be explained, in 
part, by the deeply contested nature of abortion itself.80 Some 
judges implicitly frame abortion as a moral or ideological 
matter, whereas others view it as a medical procedure and 
fundamentally a matter of health care decision-making.81 
Ironically, however, when judges view the procedure as 
primarily a moral choice, rather than subjecting the compelled 
speech to a heightened level of scrutiny, they view a wider 
range of topics as being pertinent to the professional speech 
that takes place between the doctor and the patient.82 They 
therefore treat requirements such as telling women that the 
fetus or embryo is a “whole, separate, unique, and living” 
human being as relevant, truthful, and nonmisleading.83 By 
contrast, when the judge’s understanding of the nature of the 
abortion procedure is more medical, he or she is more likely to 
characterize such mandatory disclosures as ideological in 
nature and scrutinize them carefully.84 In sum, significant 
confusion lingers in the caselaw. 
B. Identifying the Lies 
Mandatory disclosures in the abortion context are often 
misleading or likely to confuse, but not actually or entirely 
false.85 This may be true whether the disclosure is a direct 
government lie or a compelled private lie. The “suicide 
advisory” required by South Dakota (discussed in Section I.B) 
is one example. Similarly, some states require statements 
regarding fetal pain—such as that the fetus has certain 
“structures” in place by a certain gestational age that are 
“necessary” for pain perception.86 Such statements may be 
factually true in a narrow sense but are likely to be understood 
 
570 (5th Cir. 2012), with Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), and 
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo., Inc. v. 
Templeton, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1219–21 (D. Kan. 2013). 
 80. Hill, supra note 45, at 66. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 66–67. 
 83. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 736. 
 84. Hill, supra note 45, at 66. 
 85. See, e.g., Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: 
Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
111, 143 (2008). 
 86. E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(5) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-4(a)(3) 
(2017). 
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as implying that the fetus actually does feel pain, which is not 
the meaning of the statement.87 Instead, the statement that 
the fetus has the necessary anatomical structures in place 
ignores the question whether the fetus is sufficiently conscious 
to perceive pain—a complex issue mired in scientific 
uncertainty.88 
Though it is rhetorically powerful to refer to these 
statements as “lies,” the problem is often that they simply lack 
context or that they rely on existing but highly unreliable or 
even disreputable evidence.89 Thus, it is not clear that they 
should be labeled as lies. The term “lie” is a highly charged one, 
and scholars have put forward various definitions. Professor 
Helen Norton, for example, defines a lie as “a false assertion of 
fact known by the speaker to be untrue and made with the 
intention that the listener understand it to be true.”90 Professor 
Seana Shiffrin, by contrast, emphasizes two elements in her 
definition of lying: that the speaker does not believe her own 
statement to be true; and that the speaker makes the 
statement in a context in which the speaker intends her 
statement to be taken as true.91 And the philosopher Thomas 
L. Carson defines a lie as “a deliberate false statement that the 
speaker warrants to be true.”92 All of these definitions are 
difficult to apply to the sorts of misleading statements required 
in the abortion context. First, Norton’s and Shiffrin’s 
definitions rely on the speaker’s subjective intent, knowledge, 
or belief about the statement. However, in the case of a false 
statement promulgated by a state legislature—a multi-member 
body whose individual members may act with differing 
intentions and beliefs—the relevant intent or state of mind is 
difficult to identify. Moreover, it is not clear whether the 
individuals who vote for the sorts of measures discussed in this 
article are aware the mandated disclosures are false.93 Finally, 
 
 87. Tobin, supra note 85, at 143–46. 
 88. Id. at 144–45. 
 89. Indeed, Caroline Corbin uses the term “distortion” instead of “lie.” Corbin, 
supra note 32, at 1175. 
 90. Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 77. 
 91. SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 12. 
 92. THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15 
(2010). 
 93. However, Seana Shiffrin’s definition allows for reckless statements made 
without knowledge of whether they are true or false to meet her definition of lies. 
SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 13. If someone makes a statement without knowing 
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it is not entirely clear that all of the problematic disclosures are 
actually false, as is required by Carson’s and Norton’s 
definitions. Rather, they are misleading or deceptive in their 
presentation in that they are presented as truthful but aimed 
at producing false beliefs about abortion.94 
Where compelled private lies are concerned, moreover, 
there may be another complicating factor, in that the setting of 
a live doctor-patient interaction presumably allows the 
provider some flexibility in how the state’s information is 
conveyed. For example, the provider can add context to 
misleading assertions about particular medical risks. 
Moreover, legislation mandating such disclosures in the form of 
compelled private lies sometimes simply requires doctors to 
discuss particular topics—such as the link between abortion 
and breast cancer—rather than requiring particular 
statements.95 Thus, the laws arguably allow doctors to modify 
the required information by adding their own accurate and 
nonmisleading information. Nonetheless, the deceptive effect 
arises from the mere fact that the doctor is required to discuss 
a purported risk that he or she believes to be nonexistent and 
that he or she would not bring up but for the legal requirement. 
By raising and then downplaying a particular purported risk, 
the physician may nonetheless draw more attention to the risk 
than is medically warranted. Yet, if the physician chooses to 
ignore discussion of the risk altogether, even when the law 
specifically calls it out, she may be inviting a lawsuit. 
Compelled private speech thus puts abortion providers in a sort 
of catch-22: they violate the law if they avoid the state-
mandated subjects of informed consent, but at the same time, 
they are arguably providing an inaccurate impression to 
patients merely by addressing them. 
 
whether it is true, it still meets Shiffrin’s requirement that the speaker does not 
believe it to be true. Id. 
 94. As such, they are perhaps better understood as “deceptions” rather than 
“lies.” “Deception” may be defined to include statements that are intended to lead 
the listener to a false belief or confirm a false belief, whether or not the speaker 
believes the statements to be true. Id.  at 19–20; CARSON, supra note 92, at 46. 
 95. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (2017) (requiring informed consent 
to abortion to include “the particular medical risks associated with the particular 
abortion procedure to be employed including, when medically accurate, the risks 
of infection, hemorrhage and breast cancer, and the danger to subsequent 
pregnancies and infertility”). 
 442 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
C. Describing the Harm 
Finally, government-sponsored lies in the abortion context 
are particularly challenging to analyze under the standard 
First Amendment doctrinal framework because the principal 
type of harm that they cause is distinct from the type of harm 
that government-sponsored lies cause in other contexts. Unlike 
the harm caused by governmental lies aimed at the public on 
more obviously political subjects, these lies are more targeted 
at a specific individual or group, and the harm is primarily 
expressive in nature.96 This is true of all three kinds of lies I 
have identified here: direct government lies, compelled private 
lies, and false narratives. 
Some of the harms that are uniquely caused by 
government lies include injury to the listener’s dignity that 
arise from the deceptive and manipulative nature of the lies—
sometimes rising to the level of coercion or government-
sponsored deprivation of individuals’ liberty—and breach of 
trust that violates the government’s duty to its citizens and 
undermines public confidence in government.97 Moreover, 
various values served by the First Amendment are undermined 
when the government causes these harms by lying to its 
citizens. Government lies undermine individual autonomy and 
democratic self-governance.98 They also obstruct the search for 
truth, which is an important end served by the First 
Amendment.99 Recognizing that governmental lies may not be 
easy to challenge under existing First Amendment doctrine, 
however, Norton focuses on coercion as a possible touchstone of 
unconstitutionality, finding that lies may sometimes coerce 
individuals by directly interfering with their ability to exercise 
their constitutional rights.100 
 
 96. As noted below, the harm may be more like the harm that arises from 
defamatory lies about a particular individual or statements that bring a 
particular, identifiable group into disrepute. 
 97. Norton, The Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 79–83. Norton cites 
several examples of government lies, including false justifications for military 
engagement, false statements to cover up illegal activity by government officials, 
and concealing the existence of a covert program or identity of an undercover 
officer. Id. at 73–75. I argue here that such prototypical lies are less targeted at a 
particular group than lies in the abortion context, and they do not create the same 
kind of stigma. 
 98. Id. at 101. 
 99. Id. at 102. 
 100. Id. at 102–07. 
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Coercion is certainly a concern when the government 
mandates false information in the abortion context. In the 
name of ensuring that a woman’s decision is fully informed and 
therefore autonomous, states have engaged in deceptive 
behavior and even required abortion providers to serve as 
mouthpieces for misleading information.101 Even when 
factually true, there is a great danger that the information—
such as information pertaining to the physical and mental 
health risks of abortion—will be misunderstood by the woman 
and deter her from proceeding with the abortion. Moreover, the 
risk of misattribution accompanies compelled private lies, 
which force abortion providers to promote the state’s message. 
Because the state is deploying the provider to further its own 
message, the woman may assume that the false or misleading 
information is coming from her physician and accord the state-
mandated information more weight than she should. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to doubt that coercion is the 
biggest problem—or even a very real problem—with such 
misstatements in the abortion context. Although misleading 
statements have been found to reduce women’s knowledge 
about abortion,102 there is little evidence to suggest that the 
informed consent process actually leads women to change their 
minds. Indeed, researchers have demonstrated that ultrasound 
viewing, which is sometimes state-mandated as part of the 
informed consent process, has virtually no effect on a woman’s 
decision to continue with the abortion.103 Similarly, a review of 
the social science literature on mandatory counseling and 
waiting period laws found that state-required counseling, with 
or without a mandatory waiting period, likely had no effect on 
the abortion decision.104 Waiting periods accompanied by an in-
 
 101. See supra Section I.B. 
 102. N.F. Berglas et al., State-Mandated (Mis)Information and Women’s 
Endorsement of Common Abortion Myths, 27 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 129 
(2017). 
 103. Mary Gatter et al., Relationship Between Ultrasound Viewing and 
Proceeding to Abortion, 123 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 81 (2014) (finding that 
98.4 percent of women who view the ultrasound proceed to terminate the 
pregnancy, as compared to 99 percent of women who do not view the ultrasound). 
The impact is slightly greater for the small minority of women who come into the 
clinic with “low decision certainty.” Id. 
 104. THEODORE J. JOYCE ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE IMPACT OF STATE 
MANDATORY COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIOD LAWS ON ABORTION:  
A LITERATURE REVIEW 15 (Guttmacher Inst. 2009)  https://www.guttmacher. 
org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/mandatorycounseling.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4R3-
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person counseling requirement, which force women to make 
two trips to the abortion provider, were, however, “associated 
with a decline in the abortion rate, a rise in abortions obtained 
out of state and an increase in the proportion of second-
trimester abortions.”105 This suggests that the expense and 
difficulty of making multiple trips to an abortion provider may 
cause women to forgo or delay an abortion, but the information 
given in counseling does not. 
In view of this empirical evidence, I contend that the 
primary harm caused by governmental misinformation about 
abortion arises not from the deception, but rather from the 
stigmatizing or even traumatizing impact of the particular 
information conveyed. The likely outcome of providing the sorts 
of misinformation about abortion described in this article is not 
that the woman will carry to term. Rather, the more likely 
outcome is that she will terminate the pregnancy anyway, 
while experiencing fear, guilt, and shame as a result of the 
false and stigmatizing information that she is given.106 
Researchers have studied the emotional impact of 
ultrasound viewing on women seeking abortion in order to test 
the hypothesis that seeing the image of the fetus causes the 
woman to form a bond with the fetus.107 They found no 
evidence of such an effect.108 They found that the most common 
 
2PGC]. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Seana Shiffrin identifies the primary harm of lying as impeding the 
listener’s ability “to construct a reliable picture of our world, so that we can 
navigate through it and understand who we are and where we are situated”—an 
understanding that is necessary to forming moral beliefs and fulfilling moral 
duties. SHIFFRIN, supra note 5, at 9–10. This description resonates in some ways 
with my description of the expressive harm that arises from government-
sponsored falsehoods in the abortion context. I argue that the expressive injury 
consists of imposing a particular moral valence on abortion. As such, like other 
lies, the government-sponsored falsehoods distort—and are aimed at distorting—
the woman’s moral understanding of her own conduct. 
 107. Katrina Kimport et al., Beyond Political Claims: Women’s Interest in and 
Emotional Response to Viewing Their Ultrasound Image in Abortion Care, 46 
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 185, 185 (2014). This study relied 
on data from the Turnaway Study, a large-scale project in which over 700 women 
from thirty abortion clinics across the country were interviewed for approximately 
forty-five minutes one week after their abortion. The women were asked whether 
they viewed an ultrasound and how it made them feel, and they were also asked 
how difficult the decision was for them. The researchers then performed 
qualitative analysis on the women’s narrative answers, as well as logistic 
regression analysis to control for various factors. Id. 
 108. Id. at 190. However, they found that women who sought abortions in 
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emotion experienced by women after ultrasound viewing was 
neutral.109 The next most commonly reported emotions, out of 
nine possible emotions identified by the researchers, were 
negative ones—sadness or depression (49 of 212 women), guilt 
or second-guessing (30 women), or feeling upset or bad (29 
women).110 Thus, the three negative emotions combined 
significantly outweighed the neutral (77 women) or positive 
emotions (48 women).111 These findings, together with the 
conclusion that ultrasound viewing does not actually affect the 
woman’s ultimate decision, strongly suggest that the primary 
impact of ultrasound laws is to cause women to experience 
negative emotions about their already firm decision to abort. It 
is reasonable to conclude, moreover, that ideological 
information casting abortion in a negative light or falsely 
inflating the risks of the procedure would lead to similar 
negative emotions.112 
Extrapolating a bit from these studies, the available 
evidence on the actual, real-life effects of misleading abortion 
disclosures appears to be as follows. First, women generally 
believe the misleading information, so it reduces their 
knowledge about the procedure and makes their decisions less 
informed. Second, state-mandated disclosures do not have an 
effect on whether the woman carries out her decision to 
terminate her pregnancy (unless the law mandating the 
disclosures also imposes other burdens that may have a 
stronger deterrent effect, such as requiring two or more trips to 
the clinic).113 Third, at least some such requirements cause 
distress and emotional suffering for a large subset of the 
women subjected to them. Of course, not every type of 
government lie related to abortion has been carefully examined 
 
states with laws requiring they be offered ultrasounds were more likely to choose 
to view the ultrasound—“suggest[ing] the possibility that viewing ‘offers’ are 
experienced more as ‘recommendations’ by patients.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 188. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. The emotional impact of such misleading statements has not, to my 
knowledge, been systematically studied. 
 113. In one study, 36 percent to 70 percent of women undergoing pre-abortion 
counseling did not know or were unsure about several basic facts regarding 
abortion, such as whether it is safer than childbirth or whether it increases the 
risk of infertility; nonetheless, “the overwhelming majority” of women in that 
study stated that they were certain about their decision, and 86 percent had an 
abortion. Berglas et al., supra note 102, at 133. 
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in the social science literature, and the emotional impact on 
women of these legally mandated lies has not been thoroughly 
studied. These conclusions nonetheless suggest that the 
misleading nature of the information, while obviously 
troubling, is only part of the story. The expressive harm that is 
caused by the stigmatizing nature of the message is the other 
essential facet. 
III. EXPRESSIVE HARM AND THE UNDUE BURDEN FRAMEWORK 
I argued in Section II.C that the primary harm wrought by 
government-sponsored falsehoods in the abortion context is not 
that they foster misconceptions (though they certainly do that) 
or that they injure individuals’ autonomy by dissuading them 
from a particular course of action through the use of false 
pretenses (though they may sometimes do that as well). 
Rather, the primary harm in such cases is the targeted 
emotional impact caused by the stigmatizing content of the 
message. I argue here that this harm is akin to other sorts of 
“expressive harm,” such as when the government sponsors 
religious messages that violate the Establishment Clause or 
when it otherwise embraces a message that casts one group as 
inferior to another. 
A well-developed body of legal scholarship has explored the 
idea that government actions may sometimes carry a message 
that is stigmatizing to a particular group, implying that that 
group does not share equal status with other members of 
society.114 The paradigm example of this is when the 
government endorses a particular set of religious beliefs by 
promoting messages or symbols associated with only one 
religion or subset of religions.115 However, some scholars have 
suggested that the concept of expressive harm may extend to 
other constitutional contexts and forbid government actions 
that stigmatize individuals based on other characteristics such 
 
 114. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
648 (2013) (arguing that official religious speech, as well as other forms of official 
speech that expressively denigrate particular groups, violates the constitution); 
Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313 (1999) (discussing 
expressive harms); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 
“Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances 
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993). 
 115. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989). 
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as race, sex, or sexual orientation.116 I contend here that, more 
than coercion or direct threats to autonomy, the harm of 
government-mandated lies of all sorts in the abortion context is 
that they stigmatize women seeking abortions by casting 
abortion in an extremely negative light, causing emotional 
injury and distress. 
In addition, while government-mandated lies have long 
been resistant to constitutional challenge under the First 
Amendment and under the undue burden standard of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, I argue that the Supreme Court’s 
2016 decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt suggests 
a new way to challenge such misinformation. In Whole 
Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court struck down two Texas 
regulations that imposed onerous requirements on abortion 
clinics, threatening to shutter roughly three-quarters of the 
state’s existing providers.117 Although the regulations at issue 
in that case did not involve informed consent or state-
mandated misinformation, the Court, in the course of its 
analysis, revisited the meaning of Casey’s “undue burden” 
framework in ways that may prove helpful to plaintiffs seeking 
to challenge misleading abortion informed consent 
requirements. 
Before Whole Woman’s Health, under Casey, an undue 
burden was understood by many courts to exist only when a 
state abortion restriction was so onerous that a large fraction of 
women was actually prevented from accessing the abortions 
they sought.118 This framework did not provide much room for 
challenging informed consent requirements—even blatantly 
misleading ones—because it simply could not be shown that 
women were actually deterred by this information.119 
 
 116. Tebbe, supra note 114, at 650; Note, supra note 114, at 1314–18. 
 117. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2301 (2016). 
 118. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 300 (5th Cir. 
2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014); Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. 
Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Casey to “require[] courts to 
determine whether a large fraction of the women ‘for whom the law is a 
restriction’ will be ‘deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the 
[government] has outlawed abortion in all cases’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)); Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 
222 F.3d 157, 167–72 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 119. See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 
684 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a challenge to an in-person informed consent and 
waiting-period requirement because the plaintiff could not prove that the falling 
number of abortions in the state was the result of the law’s requirements). 
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Moreover, in some cases, as explained above, courts have bent 
over backwards to characterize state-mandated information in 
such a way as to hold that it was truthful, nonmisleading, and 
relevant.120 
However, the undue burden test, as newly explained in 
Whole Woman’s Health, requires courts to balance the benefits 
and burdens of a law, thereby refocusing the inquiry on the 
evidence supporting the law’s purported effects.121 If a law 
imposes a significant burden on a woman’s abortion access 
while conferring minimal benefit, that burden must be 
considered “undue.”122 Whole Woman’s Health also appears to 
place at least some burden on states to articulate a meaningful 
benefit resulting from the law and to produce evidence 
supporting that claimed benefit.123 
This reading suggests a new line of attack on misleading 
state-mandated information in the abortion context. Those 
wishing to challenge the constitutionality of misleading 
abortion disclosure requirements can argue—and 
demonstrate—that there is no actual benefit conferred by such 
requirements. As such, in the total absence of any benefit, any 
burden that the requirements impose on women seeking 
abortions must be considered “undue.” 
To the extent that state-mandated lies of all three sorts are 
justified in the name of informing a woman’s choice, it must be 
pointed out that misleading or deceptive information cannot 
meaningfully serve the purpose of informing a woman’s choice. 
And indeed, the available empirical evidence confirms that a 
woman’s knowledge about the actual risks of abortion is 
decreased rather than increased by the sorts of misleading 
information provided by the most recent spate of informed 
consent laws.124 
Whole Woman’s Health may also call into question whether 
laws such as ultrasound requirements actually advance any 
state interests unrelated to health and safety, such as 
protecting fetal life and encouraging women to choose 
 
 120. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 894 (8th 
Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 121. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10. 
 122. Id. at 2310, 2318. 
 123. Id. at 2310. 
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childbirth over abortion.125 As discussed above, the available 
evidence simply does not support the notion that women are 
susceptible to changing their mind about the abortion upon 
receiving this information in the clinic setting, after an 
abortion decision has been made.126 Most women who seek an 
abortion are certain of their decision, and disclosure 
requirements appear to do little to change that.127 Rather, 
ultrasound requirements and misleading informed consent 
laws stigmatize women and cause them emotional distress, 
with minimal to no offsetting benefits. At a minimum, in 
advancing a particular interest such as protecting fetal life, the 
state should bear the burden under Whole Woman’s Health of 
putting forth some evidence to support the notion that the law 
does in fact serve that interest. 
Finally, one can question, after Whole Woman’s Health, 
whether laws requiring burial or cremation of fetal tissue 
meaningfully advance any state interest at all. Although states 
have claimed that such provisions serve the state’s interest in 
the dignity of potential life, courts may reasonably question 
whether this interest in potential life continues to exist after 
an abortion is completed and there is no longer a potential 
life.128 And with respect to both fetal burial-or-cremation laws 
and ultrasound laws, it is also worth pointing out that the state 
does not have a legitimate interest in imposing its own 
narrative of pregnancy and motherhood upon women seeking 
abortions. As the Supreme Court explained in Casey, “[a]t the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of 
the State.”129 Similarly, one lower federal court dealing with a 
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burial-or-cremation law has recognized that the law 
“inferentially establish[ed] the beginning of human life as 
conception, potentially undermining the constitutional 
protection afforded to personal beliefs and central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”130 In addition to 
shedding doubt upon the state’s interest in fetal burial or 
cremation, this recognition also demonstrates that the sort of 
harm caused by such requirements is similar to the harm 
caused by violations of the Establishment Clause. In both 
cases, the government places its imprimatur on one set of 
religiously identified beliefs and implies that other beliefs are 
not of equal value.131 
Moreover, it is fair to read Whole Woman’s Health as 
expanding the types of harm that courts can weigh against a 
law’s purported benefits. In particular, the Court did not 
suggest that the only relevant burden is one that prevents a 
large fraction of women from obtaining an abortion at all. 
Instead, the Court gave short shrift to this concept, which was 
derived from Casey and embraced by courts that adopted a 
narrow interpretation of “undue burden.”132 Rather, the Court 
took into account the increased distances women would have to 
travel, reduced quality of care, and other intangible forms of 
harm resulting from the Texas restrictions.133 The version of 
the undue-burden test articulated in Whole Woman’s Health 
thus allows courts to take into account the expressive harm 
and stigma imposed by all three types of government-sponsored 
lies, and to weigh them against the essentially nonexistent 
health benefits, to find such requirements unconstitutional. 
There are, of course, limitations to this new avenue for 
challenging state-mandated lies in the abortion context. First, 
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expressive harm is not easily amenable to challenge under 
existing constitutional doctrine. For example, it is not clear 
what theory of standing would allow a plaintiff to challenge a 
government action that imposes only expressive harm.134 
Second, the expressive meaning of non-expressive government 
conduct may be difficult to discern, or at least subject to 
dispute in many cases.135 Finally, Whole Woman’s Health 
focused primarily on the material burdens and obstacles to 
abortion access imposed by the Texas regulations that 
threatened to close three-quarters of the state’s abortion 
clinics—a very concrete harm that is arguably quite 
distinguishable from the stigmatic harm described here. 
Nonetheless, as discussed above, Whole Woman’s Health 
clearly considered less severe and more intangible harms to be 
relevant to its analysis. Therefore, in some circumstances—
particularly those in which a material harm accompanies a 
stigmatic harm—Whole Woman’s Health offers intriguing 
possibilities. Such circumstances may occur with respect to 
laws that combine misleading informed consent requirements 
with onerous waiting-period and in-person counseling 
requirements that necessitate two or more trips to the abortion 
clinic. Concrete harm may also accompany stigmatic harm with 
respect to fetal burial-or-cremation laws if the law’s legal 
requirements are prohibitively expensive to comply with. In 
many cases, such laws may effectively shut down some or all of 
the abortion clinics in the state.136 Thus, while not a panacea, 
Whole Woman’s Health may well offer a promising way forward 
for challenging all types of state-mandated lies in the abortion 
context. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has described the various forms of misleading 
statements that states mandate for women seeking abortions. 
It argues that the harm arising from the lies in this particular 
interaction are unique and that they are distinct in several 
ways from the harms brought about by governmental lies in 
other contexts. These unique qualities render such 
requirements particularly unsuited to challenge under the 
First Amendment and under the “undue burden” standard of 
the Fourteenth Amendment as it was understood by many 
courts until recently. This article proposes, however, that the 
undue burden framework as articulated in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt may provide the most viable avenue for 
future challenges to the constitutionality of government-
mandated misinformation in the abortion context. 
 
